# CVE-2026-89540

## Summary

- **CVE ID:** CVE-2026-89540
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **CVSS Score:** 7.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
- **CWE:** N/A
- **Published:** Sep 11, 2026
- **Last Modified:** Sep 14, 2026

## Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sunrpc: init gssp_lock before publishing proc entry

create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry() publishes /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy
via proc_create_data() before init_gssp_clnt() runs mutex_init() on
sn->gssp_lock.  Once the dentry is linked under proc_subdir_lock it is
immediately reachable from userspace, so a write that lands in the
window drives set_gssp_clnt() into mutex_lock() on a zero-initialized
struct mutex.

    create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net)
      proc_create_data("use-gss-proxy", ...)   /* dentry live */
      init_gssp_clnt(sn)
        mutex_init(&sn->gssp_lock)             /* too late */

    write_gssp()
      set_gssp_clnt(net)
        mutex_lock(&sn->gssp_lock)             /* uninitialized */
        gssp_rpc_create(...)
        sn->gssp_clnt = clnt
        mutex_unlock(&sn->gssp_lock)

The window spans only the two statements between proc_create_data()
returning and init_gssp_clnt(), so a writer reaches it only if the
registering thread is preempted there while another task is already
opening the freshly published file.  register_pernet_subsys() runs in
preemptible context under pernet_ops_rwsem, so that preemption is
possible, and the window widens on auth_rpcgss module load, when the
proc entry is created for every live net namespace whose tasks are
already running.  A writer that wins the race locks a zero-filled
struct mutex.  On CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES the missing magic value trips a
"lock used without init" splat; on a production kernel the fast path
acquires the lock via CMPXCHG(owner, 0, current).  In the latter case
a second writer that arrives before init_gssp_clnt() re-zeroes owner
can enter set_gssp_clnt() concurrently, shut down the first writer's
clnt while it is still in use, and leak the loser's clnt.

Fix by initializing sn->gssp_lock in sunrpc_init_net() so its lifetime
matches the sunrpc_net it lives in.  sn->gssp_clnt is already NULL from
the kzalloc that backs net_generic storage, so the lazy helper is no
longer needed; drop init_gssp_clnt(), its prototype, and the call from
create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry().  sunrpc.ko is a build-time
dependency of auth_rpcgss.ko, so sunrpc_init_net() has always run on
every netns before any auth_gss pernet init can publish the proc
entry.

## Affected Products

- Linux — Linux (030d794bf49855f5e2a9e8dfbfad34211d1eb08b)
- Linux — Linux (3.10)
- Linux — Linux (0)
- Linux — Linux (6.12.109)
- Linux — Linux (6.18.50)
- Linux — Linux (7.2.4)
- Linux — Linux (7.3-rc1)
- Linux — Linux (5.10.270)
- Linux — Linux (5.15.221)
- Linux — Linux (6.1.188)
- Linux — Linux (6.6.157)

## References

- [CNA](https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f15b87521168c2a92cb1931f532cba422f856f01)
- [CNA](https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/edeefb111d6181a4aa278f415b005efe284b9489)
- [CNA](https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f019571928b269feebcff59926ec13294215e0e)
- [CNA](https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ce1ed6159731a41fdd0b03eedbed4e147036a5a)
- [CNA](https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/159a4fab7170badd6c4a553aef81cac079d6f4ee)
- [CNA](https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b3526ae3351968f6726bcbe25d8d09973ad79109)
- [CNA](https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f5bcdc8da15077ebe846c2756a5a17741021410)
- [CNA](https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89c8e0733e8c46b7973503f15b1b31a8587d8030)

## Exploitation Prediction (EPSS)

- **EPSS Score:** 0.13%
- **EPSS Percentile:** 2.9

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_Exported from OnDuty AI Vulnerability Intelligence on 2026-09-18._