CVE-2026-75156
Apache Airflow FAB provider versions 3.7.3 through 3.8.0 do not validate the issuer or audience of Azure AD `id_token`s during OAuth login. Deployments are affected only when the FAB auth manager is configured with Azure AD as an OAuth provider. Because the signing keys are fetched from Microsoft's **multi-tenant** JWKS endpoint, an `id_token` minted in *any* Azure tenant — including one the attacker creates — passes signature verification, and the username and role assignments are then read from that attacker-controlled token. Anyone able to register an Azure tenant can therefore authenticate to the Airflow UI with no prior access to the deployment. The fix for **CVE-2026-59243** was incomplete, and this advisory closes the remaining gap: that fix made the provider verify the `id_token` signature, but did not add issuer or audience checks. Operators who already applied the CVE-2026-59243 fix are **still affected and must upgrade again** — 3.7.3 is the release that shipped that fix, so every version containing it falls inside this affected range. Upgrade to apache-airflow-providers-fab `3.8.1` or later.
Scoring
- Severity
- CRITICAL
- CVSS base score
- 9.1
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- CWE
- CWE-346
- Published
- 2026-09-08
- Last modified
- 2026-09-08
Affected products
- Apache Software Foundation Apache Airflow FAB provider
Weakness type
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